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     ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of the chapter is to investigate how far Rae is representative of the Scottish 
Political Economy Tradition, where tradition is understood in terms of continuity in a shared 
approach, allowing for theoretical differences. While Rae conforms to most features identified 
with the Scottish tradition, his opposition to Smith’s methodology suggests a divergence of 
approach which would put him outside the tradition. It is argued here that this divergence 
applies only to Rae’s professed methodology, not to his practice.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Attention has been drawn in some recent writing to the concept of a Scottish tradition in 
political economy. Macfie (1955) first drew attention to what he saw as uniquely Scottish 
characteristics in the development of economic thought. This was picked up by Dow (1987) and 
Mair (1990) as something worthy of attention in considering the current crisis in economics. 
They suggest that the characteristics of the Scottish tradition hold much in common with 
modern non-orthodox economics. In seeking an alternative to modern orthodox economics, 
therefore, it was suggested that it would be productive to consider the Scottish tradition further. 
Such a consideration would be useful for its own sake, as a case study of an alternative body of 
thought. But further it is useful in that various strands of modern non-orthodox economics may 
be seen to have been directly influenced by the Scottish tradition. For example, Skinner (1990, 
163) notes elements in common between the Scottish tradition on the one hand, and the German 
historical school and American institutionalism on the other, while Prychitko (1995, 13) finds 
Scottish roots in Austrian economics. Mair (1990) makes the point about Scottish ancestry 
explicitly with respect to Rae, pointing to his (sometimes) acknowledged influence on Austrian 
economics, American institutionalism and Schumpeterian economics (see also Elliott, 1983; 
Edgell and Tilman, 1991). 
 
It is the purpose of this chapter to consider the particular issue of whether or not Rae should (as 
Macfie and Mair attest) be regarded as representative of the Scottish tradition. The first step is to 
consider what is meant by the concept of tradition itself. .In the following section we consider 
why we might expect Rae to conform to the Scottish tradition (particularly given his emigration 
from Scotland). Then we consider in some detail the Scottish tradition in political economy, and 
Rae’s work in relation to it. Since Smith is often taken (eg by Dow, 1987) as archetypal of the 
Scottish tradition, and yet Rae is often seen as counterposing himself to Smith, particular 
attention is paid to a comparison between Rae and Smith. It will be argued that Rae may indeed 
be treated as representative of the tradition in many respects, particularly with reference to his 
practice of economics. But it will be argued that he was not representative in the way in which 
he professed his methodology. 
 
 
THE CONCEPT OF TRADITION 
 
The concept of intellectual tradition is not altogether straightforward. An attempt has been made 
in Dow et al (1995) to specify what is meant by it, in particular distinguishing the notion of 
tradition from other classifications of thought. Other possibilities include ‘schools of thought’, 
‘paradigms’ and ‘research programmes’. While all of these modes of classification, including 
tradition, entail some overlap, there are features of the concept of tradition which make it most 
satisfactory for capturing the characteristics of Scottish thought which were evident in the early 
Scottish economists and which can be identified in those influenced by them.  
 
A ‘school of thought’ is generally used to refer to a collection of economists who are roughly 
contemporaries, as in the German historical school. This contemporaneity in turn entails direct 
communication among the participants. Given technological advance in communications, 
schools may now be more geographically dispersed than in Rae’s time, when a school would 
tend to be identified with a particular geographical area. While it is clearly a matter of degree, 
the concept of tradition refers rather to a lengthy period of time, where ideas are passed on 
from one generation to the next through a variety of means, of which direct communication is 
only one.  
 
Thus the concept of tradition is a more diffuse than the concept of a school, referring to the 
conditions which lead economists in one generation to be subject to intellectual influences 
similar to those of their predecessors, and to absorb the ideas developed by their predecessors. 
The concept of tradition thus entails the notion of continuity in the influences which nurture the 
tradition. These influences include the educational, philosophical and cultural environment. 
This emphasis on a nurturing environment is evident in all of Macfie, Dow and Mair’s 
discussions of the Scottish tradition. Further, continuities over the centuries in the cultural, 
religious, intellectual and educational environment in Scotland may serve to explain the 
continuation of aspects of the tradition to the present day which are identified by all three 
authors. 
 
Where individuals carry the tradition elsewhere, as in Rae’s case, there must be sufficient in the 
new environment in common with the old to nurture a continuation of the tradition. In 
considering Rae in relation to the Scottish tradition, therefore, we need to consider the scope of 
its influence before he left Scotland, and the degree to which the new environment in which he 
found himself nurtured the tradition. First, Rae was brought up in Scotland and therefore 
absorbed the syle of reasoning, and types of concerns, which characterised all aspects of life in 
Scotland. A philosophical approach to questions addressing practical and moral concerns was 
most evident in the Scottish system of higher education. A Scottish Arts degree, such as Rae 
took at Marischal College in 1815 is described by Davie (1964, 11) as follows: 
  
If we look more closely at the Scottish Arts course....its really distinctive factor, its 
unique peculiarity as compared with courses not merely in England but on the Continent 
would seem to be that, while classics and the exact sciences were taught in addition to 
philosophy, the standard attained in the philosophical side of the course was 
considerably higher than in the other two parts of it. This was the result of an 
arrangement whereby the student regularly got a double dose, each from a different point 
of view, of the central problems of the Theory of Knowledge, such as Perception, 
Universals and Causality. The student was first taken through this very difficult subject 
by the Professor of Logic, and then again the following year by the Professor of Moral 
Philosophy. 
 
Further, as Davie demonstrates, the prominence of this approach to philosophy in the 
curriculum was reflected in the style and content of other disciplines. Thus, while Rae 
proceeded to study medicine at Edinburgh, medicine itself had a philosophical focus, and one 
which encouraged argument from first principles in order to address practical issues. Thus, for 
example, the major figure in Scottish medicine, Cullen, was primarily interested ‘in finding a 
general theory of disease which would connect up with speculation about the nature of life, and 
its relations to mind and matter.’ (Davie, 1964, 23-4). The social sciences too emerged under the 
influence of the Scottish philosophical tradition which had been institutionalised in the Scottish 
higher education tradition. 
 
This was the set of influences which Rae carried with him when he emigrated from Scotland. It 
is evident from his prominent role in attempting to promote Scottish values in Canada that Rae 
was strongly conscious of the distinctiveness of his Scottish upbringing. Further, there was 
sufficient in common between the educational, religious and cultural environment in Canada 
and that of Scotland (not least because of the influence of Scottish immigrants in a wide variety 
of fields) that Rae would have found a significant degree of continuity. Nevertheless, it is likely 
that his infrequent contact with other scholars must have allowed the influence of the Scottish 
tradition to dim somewhat. 
 
A tradition is distinctive in a third important aspect. In particular it differs from a paradigm or 
research programme in that these entail some fundamental agreement on foundations. In the 
case of a paradigm, there is agreement on world-view and choice of methods of enquiry (see 
Kuhn, 1974), such that normal science (representative of the paradigm) consists of addressing 
puzzles within the agreed framework. In the case of a research programme, there is agreement 
on a hard core set of assumptions, and on a negative and positive heuristic to direct lines of 
enquiry (see Lakatos, 1970). Again there is overlap with the concept of tradition in that a 
tradition entails some shared methodological principles. But a tradition is a looser concept than 
paradigm or research programme, allowing for disagreements which spawn different theories 
based on different assumptions. Thus, for example, both Marxian and Neo-Austrian economics 
can be seen to have had roots in the Scottish tradition. 
 
This embracing of theoretical differences is important for any discussion of the Scottish political 
economy tradition, in that there were unquestionably differences among key figures in the 
tradition who were contemporaries, and even more so among those who were not. Certainly the 
content of Rae’s economics differed from that of Smith, although it can be argued that Rae 
exaggerated these differences, and that there was a significant amount of content in common 
(see Hollander, this volume). We will consider in more detail below the particular differences 
between Rae and Smith on methodology, since it is at that level that a tradition is defined. It is 
important therefore to identify those elements which define the tradition in order to identify 
those differences which are compatible with  the tradition and those which are not.  In the next 
section, we consider in turn the various features which identify the Scottish tradition. Rae’s 
work is considered in relation to each of these features. 
 
 
THE SCOTTISH POLITICAL ECONOMY TRADITION 
 
The Scottish political economy tradition can be identified in terms of a range of features (as 
outlined in Dow, 1987): 
 
 (1) A concern with practical issues.  
 
Macfie regards this predilection as the result of the influence of an emphasis on Roman culture 
in Scottish classical education, rather than Greek culture. But it is in fact hard to disentangle 
cause from effect; all fields of Scottish life were approached in this manner (from religion to 
mathematics), which in turn must have encouraged the interest in Roman culture. Indeed the 
necessities of a poor nation must have forced a concern with practical issues. A consequence of 
particular interest was the development of Common Sense philosophy. Philosophy in turn, and 
in particular  moral philosophy coloured the approach taken to all other disciplines, through the 
higher education system.  
 
Rae clearly conforms to this feature in his evident concern with the practical issues posed by 
survival in the Canadian wilderness in particular, and of innovation and economic development 
in general.   
  
(2) A consequent  preference for breadth of understanding of the background to these 
 issues, over depth of understanding of  isolated  aspects of issues. 
 
The theory of knowledge most closely associated with the Scottish tradition arising from the 
Enlightenment period is represented in Thomas Reid’s Philosophy of Common Sense. As Davie 
(1986, 187) puts it: 
 
 ‘Common sense knowledge...is knowledge of bodies which we could not get from the 
senses when they are in isolation from one another but which can be got from the senses 
when they are employed in co-operation so as to enable us to compare them together. 
The importance of this common sense knowledge is that it gives us a knowledge of 
aspects of things which in a genuine way transcends the senses and which thus is rightly 
called intellectual knowledge.’ 
 
The emphasis then is on knowledge arising from a combination of sources, rather than liinearly 
from single sources. As Macfie (1955, 84) puts it: 
 
‘[T]he Scottish method is more concerned with giving a broad well balanced 
comprehensive picture seen from different points of view than with logical rigour. In 
fact, Smith was...a philosophic writer....His aim was to present all the relevant facts 
critically. Modern writers start from a totally different angle. They found on the law of 
non-contradiction. they aim at isolating one aspect of experience and breaking it down 
by analysis into its logical components.’ 
 
Rae’s work conforms to this approach. In chapter 14 of the New Principles of Political 
Economy, Rae (1834, 320) provides a summary account ‘of the combined operation of the 
causes investigated in the preceding chapters’ with respect to the determination of ‘the nature 
and production of stock’. The causes are classified according to whether they are material, not 
material, and partly material, partly not material. Thus, the nature of man is investigated as well 
as the nature, level and productivity of factors of production. Further, Rae is explicit that social 
science, in taking account of the nature of man, must reflect the complexity of the interactions 
between causal forces. Thus, referring to his analysis of the causes of economic development, 
Rae (1834, 323) points out: 
 
‘We have considered them separately, but they never appear so, always acting in 
combination. This circumstance would not of itself affect any conclusions concerning 
them, for it applies to phenomena of all sorts, the causes influencing every one being 
compound. But the peculiar nature of the human mind, rather excited to action by 
motives, than passively operated on by them, and moulding, therefore, its energies to 
suit the course it adopts, occasions a difference between phenomena influenced by it and 
all others. Hence, according to the preponderating motive, and the course of action 
followed, the same powers and principles take opposite directions, and the will is able to 
draw to its purposes and make allies of those which would seem naturally opposed to it.’ 
 
  
(3) A preference for drawing on several disciplines in an integrated manner to provide
 that breadth. 
 This approach to knowledge was embodied in the breadth of the education system. But there 
was further a cross-fertilisation between disciplines which may be explained in large part by 
their common philosophical underpinnings. Indeed the social sciences emerged first as teaching 
applications of logic and moral philosophy. In turn, since this knowledge was being applied to 
practical issues, the scope for isolating aspects of these issues was limited if the results were to 
be at all useful. Since the chain of reasoning was not allowed to diverge too much from the 
question at hand, the importance of understanding context was of great importance, as was the 
need to take account of the complexity of influences on that context. 
 
Again, Rae conforms to this characterisation. He was concerned with questions which required 
attention to a wide range of disciplines. Thus, for example, he had planned at one stage to 
develop a natural history of man built on a philosophical conception of human society (see 
James, 1951, 143). In his work on innovation, Rae quite deliberately took into account a much 
wider range of factors than the strictly economic, drawing in particular on history and scoiology. 
Indeed it was his innovative development of the sociological approach to economics which was 
emphasised in the retitling of his New Principles by Mixter as The Sociological Theory of 
Capital, when the book was reissued in 1905, and which inspired Irving Fisher’s admiration 
(see James, 1951). 
 
 
(4) A preference for arguing from first principles 
 
In addressing practical issues, Scottish Enlightenment thought was addressing the challenge of 
new practical problems, requiring innovative chains of reasoning. While this required the 
creative combining of different approaches to knowledge as outlined in (2) and (3) above, some 
principles were required to provide a starting-point. In the social sciences these principles 
referred to the nature of man and of society. But the nature of man and of society were 
understood to be complex, and non-deterministic, reflecting the origin of the social sciences as 
applications of moral philosophy. Thus for example, Smith’s use of the concept of self-interest 
was built on his understanding of man’s social nature, as represented in his development of the 
concept of sympathy in the Theory of Moral Sentiments. The first principles of the Scottish 
tradition should therefore not be confused with the axioms of conventional modern economics, 
which provide a deterministic, reductionist account of man. 
 
Rae again fits well into this aspect of the Scottish tradition. Rae explicitly sets out, in The New 
Principles of Political Economy, to develop his own set of first principles. In the process, he 
questions Smith’s principle of the division of labour. He carefully builds up his principles from 
an enquiry into the nature of man, the nature of capital and the nature of wealth. But as the 
quotation in (3) above makes clear, his analysis of human behaviour is of something creative, 
pro-active and non-deterministic, allowing a range of chains of reasoning from his principles. 
Indeed, Rae (1834, 96) explicitly refers to man as ‘an organic being’, precluding the atomistic 
representation of economic man, as he was later represented by orthodox economics. Rae thus 
also embodied another important feature of the Scottish tradition, namely: 
 
(5) A specification of first principles in terms of a non-individualistic representation of 
 human nature, with a consequent emphasis on social or conventional behaviour. 
 
 
(6) A preference for approaching a subject's first principles by discussing their 
historical development 
 
This feature of  the Scottish tradition again derives from the system of higher education and 
from its philosophical foundations. Because knowledge was not seen as an axiomatic system 
which could by parcelled up into discrete disciplines, each discipline was presented as an 
evolution of ideas drawing on a range of influences. The predominant teaching method was thus 
to impart first principles by means of teaching the historical evolution of the discipline through a 
variety of contexts. Mathematics, for example, was taught in this way, rather than as a closed 
axiomatic system.  As Davie (1961, 11) puts it:  
 
‘The Professors of Mathematics found, for example, that the best way to render their 
task of imparting the elements of geometry, algebra and arithmetic interesting to 
themselves and to their youthful pupils was to concentrate on the philosophy and the 
history of the branches of mathematics in question, and to treat the mathematics class as 
a cultural course, concerned with the relations of the subject to social life and to the 
plain man.’ 
 
This approach is clearly evident in the extensive historical reference in The Wealth of Nations. It 
is also manifest in Rae’s New Principles. In the chapter concerned with ‘the causes of the 
progress of invention, and of the effects arising from it’ (chapter 10), Rae displays an extensive 
knowledge of a wide range of ancient societies in order to develop is principles.  
 
 
 (7) An acceptance of the limitations of theory 
 
and  
 
(8) A recognition of the sociological and psychological aspects of theory appraisal 
 
 
While the Enlightenment project in political economy can be understood as an attempt to 
specify a socio-economic system, along the lines of the systems being developed in the natural 
sciences, it was a particular feature of the Scottish enlightenment that no claim was made as to 
the absolute truth value of the system. In particular, in The History of Astronomy, Smith 
outlined a psychological theory of the development of knowledge which suggested that 
knowledge progressed by means of providing psychological satisfaction rather than by 
demonstrably approaching absolute truth. 
 
Rae on the other hand does appear to see his task as establishing absolute truth. He was 
concerned about limitations to knowledge in terms of the difficulty of prediction (given the 
problem of induction) and the difficulty in identifying true causes as opposed to surface 
appearances of cause (see Hamouda, this volume). But he explicitly challenges Smith’s view of 
science as being opposed to the principle of induction: 
 
‘Now, I apprehend, that the spirit of the philosophy of the author of the Wealth of 
Nations was completely opposed to the inductive philosophy - the philosophy of Bacon, 
and that he never intended that that work should be received as if established on it.’  
(Rae, 1834, 328) 
 (see further Rae, 1834, 331-2).  Rae then argues instead for the Baconian approach of induction 
as the best means for discovering truth; theory appraisal then proceeds according to the principle 
of falsification. Rae here would appear to be at odds with the Scottish tradition.  
 
Since these are the two areas in which Rae appears to be at odds with the Scottish tradition, we 
shall make this the focus of attention of the next section. There we explore in more detail these 
last two aspects of the Scottish tradition, and Rae’s stance on them. Since Rae expressed his 
views on methodology in direct opposition to those of Smith, we will use this apparent 
opposition as a basis for discussing how far Rae did in fact depart form the Scottish tradition in 
these two aspects. 
 
 
 
RAE’S METHODOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF SMITH 
 
In order better to understand the philosophical background to Smith and to Rae, Coleman’s 
(1996) analysis of Enlightenment rationalism is helpful. There he discusses the tensions 
between the rationalists, who see uniformity in nature (including human nature) and the anti-
rationalists who see diversity in nature. The former are drawn towards deductivism, based on 
self-evident axioms. The latter are drawn towards empirical work in an attempt to identify 
regularities. But, Coleman argues that the two may come together in theorising, where the 
former build theories on self-evident truths and the latter on empirically-established axioms. 
Coleman argues that the Scottish Enlightenment represented a complex combination of 
rationalism and anti-rationalism. Indeed, Hume (1975; 1751) denied the validity of the 
distinction between a priori axioms and observed regularities, on the grounds that ultimately the 
former were based on observation.  Thus in Stewart (1867) we find an emphasis on the 
importance of general principles, along with inductivism; this was justified on the grounds that 
the general principles arose from experience.  
 
But both Stewart and Reid, whom he greatly influenced, explicitly objected to the 
instrumentalist aspect of Smith’s epistemology evident in the History of Astronomy, where he 
argued that speculative hypotheses may help us to identify underlying causes which mere 
observation cannot reveal. Certainly Smith pointed out that only those principles which 
accorded with already-understood knowledge would gain acceptance, in accordance with the 
philosophy of common sense. But his greater willingness to contemplate hypothetical 
knowledge raises the question as to whether he is in fact atypical of the Scottish tradition. This 
is of importance if we are to regard Smith as the archetypal Scottish political economist. It is 
also significant in understanding the subsequent, deductivist, developments in economics. Our 
concern here is to consider Rae’s methodological position, expressed as it is in counterpoint to 
Smith.  
 
Coleman’s schema, employing the traditional dualistic categories of deduction and induction, 
rationalism and anti-rationalism, is useful here because Rae himself expressed his methodology 
dualistically.  Certainly dualism was a feature of the Enlightenment period in general. But the 
problem in applying this schema to the Scottish tradition, even in arguing that the Scottish 
approach entailed a combination of opposites, is that that tradition is non-dualistic. The moral 
philosophical foundations of knowledge, the openness to different disciplines, the consciousness 
of  the importance of history and context, and above all the social conception of human nature, 
embracing creativity and active agency, and the driving force of addressing practical problems 
all preclude a focus on duals (see Dow, 1990). The rationalism of the Scottish Enlightenment 
was not the rationalism of the English Enlightenment. Certainly Smith was a system builder, 
which requires a belief in some underlying order. But that system was not deterministic, given 
his (typically Scottish) conception of human nature. Certainly Smith introduced the notion of a 
psychological theory of the development of knowledge. But that did not mean that he saw 
theory as developing independently of observation; a glance through The Wealth of Nations is 
sufficient to establish that argument. 
 
For all Reid’s own objections to Smith, we would argue that his philosophy of Common Sense 
represents the balance struck within the Scottish theory of knowledge between observation and 
theory. Observation is necessary, but intellectual knowledge, based on wide-ranging 
observation, has its own legitimacy (see Davie, 1986, chapter 10). Reid’s argument with Smith 
is an argument over the sourse of intellectual knowledge. But the Scottish philosophic tradition 
grounds intellectual knowledge in observation while giving it its own legitimacy. Smith had 
gone further by probing the motivation for and process of generating intellectual knowledge, 
which in no way undermines realist philosophy unless it involves a dualistic dichotomisation 
between observation and theory. Both Reid and Smith had a (rationalist) belief in the existence 
of underlying forces which generated an ordered system. Observation of surface phenomena 
could be misleading. But the order was not a deterministic order, so that a retreat into 
deductivism with the aid of some universal self-evident axioms was not feasible. For Smith, the 
division of labour and the operation of self-interest were governing principles, but what these 
actually meant in practice required detailed observation of the social, political, historical etc 
context, so that theory could never depart significantly from observation if it were to be useful 
in addressing practical questions. 
 
Rae presented his New Principles as a critique of Smith, at the level of content (notably with 
respect to the distinction between individual and national wealth) but also at the level of 
methodology. In chapter 15 of the New Principles, Rae challenges the understanding of Smith 
as engaging in induction, arguing rather that he engages in 'explanation'. The difference in 
content is purported by Rae to follow from the difference in method; he criticises Smith for 
confusing effects with causes. He suggests that Smith has taken phenomena to be principles, 
rather than investigating further in order to find the real principles; thus he adopts the common 
man's confusion between individual wealth and national wealth, presuming rather than 
investigating the causal relations between the two. On the face of it it would seem that Rae took 
a quite different approach to Smith and thus cannot be thought to be representative of the 
Scottish tradition. 
 
Rae’s methodological argument with Smith concerns the source of intellectual knowledge. Like 
Smith, Rae too seeks to identify underlying forces which are not apparent from simple 
observation. By criticising Smith for relying unduly on surface appearances, ie on popular 
common sense knowledge, Rae is arguing that Smith is not trying hard enough to develop 
intellectual knowledge of the underlying system. What Smith identifies as cause (the division of 
labour), Rae identifies as the effect of innovation. Rae’s argument therefore seems to be that 
Smith is not taking a particular methodology far enough, not that he is employing a different 
(less-preferred) methodology. Their differences over general principles may then be treated as 
differences in theoretical content rather than methodological differences. 
 
But Rae goes further in arguing that Smith does not go far enough because he does not employ 
the method of induction: 
  
‘To me it appears that [Smith’s] philosophy is that of explanation and system, and that 
his speculations are not to be considered as inductive investigations and expositions of 
the real principles guiding the successions of phenomena, but as successful efforts to 
arrange with regularity, according to common and preconceived notions, a multiplicity 
of known facts.’         (Rae, 1834, 
331) 
 
Following Francis Bacon, Rae sets out the position of falsification as the means for establishing 
true knowledge: 
 
'The whole inductive philosophy may, indeed, be said to rest on the impossibility of the 
occurrence of exceptions to real laws. Hence the extensive use of negative instances, 
determining, at last, what is a principle by pointing out what is not.' (Rae, 1834, .344) 
He proceeds to illustrate the principle by pointing out counter-examples to Smith's argument 
that the wealth of nations is promoted by the seeking of individual wealth. (His reference here to 
gamblers is apposite to modern discussions about the activities of financial markets.) 
 
The impression is created by Rae that Smith is deductivist and Rae inductivist. This impression 
is created partly by Rae’s imposition of the dualistic categories (deduction and induction) 
employed by Bacon. This dualistic approach is uncharacteristic of the Scottish epistemological 
tradition, reflecting more diverse influences on Rae. It belies the complex interrelationship 
between observation and theory intrinsic to the Scottish approach. In particular, while Smith 
may have focused more than most on the role of conjecture in theory-building, the driving force 
behind theory-building for him was in fact falsificationism. In the History of Astronomy, Smith 
provided an account of theorising which centred theory development on the response to 
surprise, ie to contrary observations. The dualistic approach also belies both Smith and Rae’s 
actual methodological practice. Both, consistent with the Scottish tradition, intertwine extensive 
observation with an attempt to build up intellectual knowledge of underlying forces; they 
intertwine in the sense that observation provides the material for conjecture, and also the test of 
conjecture. The New Principles is best understood as setting out a system of economic 
development based on the principle of innovation, just as the Wealth of Nations is best seen as a 
system of economic development based on the principle of the division of labour. But it is 
important that it be borne in mind that, in line with the Scottish tradition, these systems are open 
systems, and cannot therefore be thought of in deductivist terms.  
 
As far as the limitations to theory are concerned, both Smith and Rae had been influenced by 
Hume’s scepticism about inductive knowledge, and were therefore conscious of the limitations 
on the scope for establishing arguments. This scepticism was reinforced by their understanding 
of the necessary openness of theorising about evolving social systems; while it might be 
possible to agree on general principles, the meaning and applicability of those principles in 
particular contexts required detailed observation and exercise of judgement. Nevertheless, the 
goal was to identify underlying forces; for all the limitations to theory, there was a belief in the 
existence of real forces which it was the purpose of science to identify. 
 
The conclusion emerges that Smith and Rae were much closer than Rae’s statement of their 
methodological differences would imply. Indeed, Rae later acknowledges that his criticisms are 
directed more at Smith’s followers than Smith himself: 
 
'I shall conclude these remarks, by observing, that iin my opinion the disciples and 
followers of Smith, in claiming for the speculations contained in  the Wealth of Nations, 
and for the doctrines they have founded on them, the rank of an experimental science, 
the conclusions of which are entitled to the same credence with other experimental 
sciences act injudiciously, and by insisting on pretensions which are unfounded, injure 
the cause of that philosopher and conceal his real merits'.  (Rae, 1834; 1964, p.350). 
 
But the History of Astronomy remains as a potential bone of contention, constituting as it did the 
focus of  expressions of methodological differences between Smith and other key figures in the 
Scottish tradition. We devote the next section to a consideration of the History of Astronomy in 
relation to the New Principles, and again find much in common between the two.  
 
 
A MISSED  CONNECTION BETWEEN RAE AND SMITH 
 
The History of Astronomy was concerned with understanding the sentiments ‘surprise’, 
‘wonder’ and ‘admiration’ which provide the stimulus for the development of knowledge: 
 
‘It is the design of this Essay to consider particularly the nature and causes of each of 
these sentiments, whose influence is of far wider extent than we should be apt upon a 
careless view to imagine.’ (Smith, 1980, 34) 
 
Philosophers are motivated in their theorising by the need to dispel the sense of wonder, or 
discomfort, caused by surprising observations, ie those which do not accord with currently-held 
theories, and by the admiration inspired by new theories which accommodate these 
observations.  
 
‘Wonder, therefore, and not any expectation of advantage from its discoveries, is the 
first principle which prompts mankind to the study of Philosophy, of that science which 
pretends to lay open the concealed connections which unite the various appearances of 
nature; and they pursue this study for its own sake, as an original pleasure or good in 
itself, without regarding its tendency to procure them the means of many other 
pleasures.’  
         (Smith, 1980, 51) 
 
There are interesting parallels between the History of Astronomy and chapter 10 of the New 
Principles, where Rae investigates ‘the causes of the progress of invention’ (as well as its 
effects). Rae too distinguishes between inventors and other members of society, and seeks to 
explain what motivates them. Inventors are not motivated by the prospect of gaining wealth, 
since the outcomes of invention are subject to considerable uncertainty, and thus do not attract 
certain reward. Indeed Rae goes to some length to outline the hardships and lack of recognition 
which are the customary lot of inventors: 
 
‘We in vain search for any sufficient motive exciting to this course of action, unless the 
good arising from communicating good, and the consequent desire to be a benefactor in 
the most extended possible manner.’ (Rae, 1834, 210) 
 
It is notable for our purposes that Rae explicitly refers to Bacon’s parallel argument about the 
motivation for the advance of science (Rae, 1834, 216-7). Indeed the conflation of Rae’s use of 
the concept ‘invention’ with the concept of ‘science’ is encouraged, not only by his reference in 
both contexts to ‘men of genius’, but also by the reader’s perception that Rae’s account of the 
lot of the inventor arises from his perceptions of his own situation as someone developing 
knowledge about the role of invention in economic development.  
 
Rae’s account of the ‘man of genius’ does not accord well with a purist inductivist position. 
Referring to the isolation of men of genius from society, Rae continues: 
 
‘Abstract and scientific truth can only be discovered, by deep and absorbing meditation; 
imperfectly at first discerned, through the medium of its dull capacities, the intellect 
slowly, and cautiously, not without much of doubt, and many unsuccessful essays, 
succeeds in lifting the veil that hides it.’      (Rae, 1834, 213-4) 
 
Rae identifies the motive of accumulation (the selfish motive of practical men) as encouraging 
invention along with the (selfless) motivation of the inventor to discovery. But the two 
motivations may act contrarily when the social order is disrupted, eg by war. While such 
disturbances make the prospect of accumulation subject to greater uncertainty, thus weakening 
the accumulation  motive, they actively encourage the inventive faculty. In making this 
argument, Rae comes close to the Smith of the History of Astronomy: 
 
‘Whatever, therefore, breaks the wonted order of events, and exposes the necessity, or 
the possibility, of connecting them by some other means, strongly stimulates invention.’ 
          (Rae, 1834, 223) 
 
But Rae does not give any sign of recognising common ground between himself and Smith in 
this regard. For all the discussion of the motivation for invention appears to apply equally to 
knowledge in general as well as to solutions to practical problems, the extensive examples of 
invention refer exclusively to the latter. Further, the emphasis in the examples is on the 
accumulation motive, with inventions being stimulated by resource shortages, requiring new 
technology applied to existing resources, or  the development of alternative resources. The 
connection is not taken further between the practical man wishing to overcome constraints and 
the man of genius who invents the mechanism for doing so from the much wider range of 
knowledge he has developed, being uncertain of the outcome of his enquiries.  
 
It seems unfortunate that, having himself been so innovative in developing the concept of 
invention and between his discussion of invention and his discussion of scientific methodology. 
His use of the word ‘speculation’ to describe the activities of the inventor holds echoes of 
Smith’s discussion of scientific enquiry; there are strong  parallels in the motivations of 
pursuing knowledge for its own sake, and seeking connecting principles from discordant 
observations. It was left to the neo-Austrians to develop in tandem the nature and origins of 
knowledge in economic theory and of knowledge in the economy.  
 
   
CONCLUSION 
 
We have defined the concept of tradition as referring to a continuity over generations in 
epistemological and methodological approach, allowing for accommodation of theoretical 
differences. We have argued that Rae conforms to most aspects of the Scottish political 
economy tradition.  
 
The two areas of potential conflict are differences over perceptions of the limitations of theory, 
and a recognition of the sociological and psychological aspects of theory development. Rae pits 
himself against Smith by taking an avowedly purist inductivist position, following Bacon. The 
dualistic way in which he expresses this position is at odds with the Scottish tradition; further, it 
seems to entail  an understanding of science as revealing truth. But the practice of Rae’s 
enquiries are in the mainstream of Scottish methodology, emphasising the importance of general 
principles, which have their origin in experience, but which have their own legitimacy as 
intellectual knowledge. Further, these principles are developed and applied in the full 
consciousness of the importance of context, so that their discussion never departs far from 
detailed contextual accounts. His principles are different from Smith’s, and thus have important 
differences of implications. But the methodology is very similar. 
 
Rae joins with others in rejecting Smith’s psychological account of theory development, as if it 
were counterposed to the principle of induction.  But Rae’s own account of the motivation for 
science is very similar to Smith’s. In fact he could have benefited considerably from paying 
more attention to the History of Astronomy, since contrary evidence (or falsification) is a 
primary motive for Smith in theory development. It is unfortunate that Rae seems to have 
conflated his opposition to the content of Smith’s economics with an opposition to his 
philosophy of science, when in fact the latter was not too far away from that of Rae. Indeed, 
given the centrality of knowledge to Rae’s economics, it is unfortunate that he did not use 
Smith’s ideas for his own purposes.  
 
How then does Rae stand in relation to the Scottish tradition as we have defined it? Mair (1991) 
distinguishes between ‘legitimate’ and ‘bastard’ lines in the tradition running from Smith, where 
Rae is identified with the bastard tradition. But Pesciareli (1994) argues that the diversity 
represented by Smith and Rae is compatible with a single tradition. Clearly there are 
differences; it is a matter of judgement how much importance is given to these differences. In 
our judgement, if we ignore Rae’s statement of his methodology and focus rather on his 
practice, he sits squarely in the Scottish political economy tradition. 
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